Breaking Good: Moral Agency, Neuroethics, and the Spontaneity of Compassion by Coseru, Christian
109
Chapter 6
Breaking Good
moral agency, neuroethics, and 
the spontaneity of compassion
Christian Coseru
6.1.  Introduction
Although the credit for announcing the advent of “neural Buddhism” goes 
to the New York Times op- ed columnist David Brooks (2008)— who sees it 
as the natural outcome of a new wave of research into the neuroscience of 
religious experience— it is Nietzsche who most eloquently (and disquiet-
ingly) proclaimed its arrival more than a century ago. In On the Genealogy 
of Morality, Nietzsche (2006, p. 7) speaks of the morality of compassion and 
of the many (by his own estimation sinister) ways it has cast around “even 
wider to catch even philosophers and make them ill”— the philosophers’ sick-
ness being nothing but the symptom of a culture about to give birth to a new 
“European Buddhism.”
Contemporary moral psychology lacks a systematic account of compas-
sion.1 Nonetheless a little over a century since Nietzsche’s proleptic pro-
nouncement, this genealogical quest for the roots of morality is giving birth 
to a new ethics: call it Buddhist neuroethics. As a specific domain of inquiry 
Buddhist neuroethics describes a constellation of moral and epistemological 
concerns about the exercise of practical reason in the age of brain science. As a 
taxonomical category, it simply functions in much the same way as Francisco 
Varela’s “neurophenomenology” and Patricia Churchland’s “neurophiloso-
phy,” terms coined to designate new domains of inquiry born from the rel-
evance and applicability of neuroscientific research to traditional issues in 
phenomenology and philosophy of mind. In the broadest sense of the term, 
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Buddhist neuroethics stands for the collective (and concerted) eﬀort to make 
diﬀerent aspects of moral cultivation and contemplative practice receptive 
to the findings and conceptual resources of neuroscience. As such, it shares 
many features with programs in both neurophenomenology and neurophi-
losophy, as well as with newer programs in neuroethics (specifically, those 
concerned with how understanding the human mind, and our ability to pre-
dict, influence, and even control aspects of it, aﬀects our moral views).
This paper addresses two specific and related questions the Buddhist 
neuroethics program raises for our traditional understanding of Buddhist 
ethics: Does aﬀective neuroscience supply enough evidence that contempla-
tive practices such as compassion meditation can enhance normal cognitive 
functioning? Can such an account advance the philosophical debate concern-
ing freedom and determinism in a profitable direction? A satisfactory answer 
to the first question is simply a matter of identifying the relevant empirical 
evidence necessary to support a Buddhist neuroethics project.2 The second 
question does not invite a straightforward answer. The long- running debate 
over the compatibility of freedom and determinism has moved mainly in two 
directions. Those approaching the problem from a metaphysical standpoint 
generally argue for some version of incompatibilism, on the grounds that, if 
determinism is true, it is incompatible with free will, and if it is false, we are 
left with an indeterminism that makes free will irrelevant. Those taking an 
empirical approach (and thus more sensitive to the findings of cognitive sci-
ence) argue for some version of compatibilism. Specifically, certain versions 
of neocompatibilism are regarded as capable of accommodating freedom and 
determinism because they see its exercise as constrained by the very causal 
and conditioning factors that make freedom possible. Freedom is not free (so 
to speak) if it is not constrained by the reasons we give for choosing one way 
or another. Unconstrained freedom, at least on the neocompatibilist account, 
is a deeply incoherent notion.
In response to the first question, I will argue that dispositions such as 
empathy and altruism can in eﬀect be understood in terms of the mechanisms 
that regulate aﬀective cognition. Not only does such understanding make a 
good case for causal explanation, but it also reflects the generally naturalist 
outlook of Buddhist moral psychology; indeed, given that dispositions and 
reasons have an event structure (that is, they are constituted as mental states 
with specific intentional content) they are also causes, or at least are causally 
relevant for action.3 But causal explanation is no substitute for understanding 
what it is about our capacity to choose that makes us moral agents. It seems 
as though at the most basic level choice is deeply embedded in mechanisms 
that regulate our capacity to discriminate and form judgments. If that is the 
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case, then the roots of morality lie much deeper in the structure of conscious 
behavior than one might think.4
In response to the second question, I  want to claim that moral agency 
is a type of achievement that comes with learning the norms of ethical con-
duct, which are not tractable by specifically neurobiological mechanisms and 
processes (though, once learned, such norms would have their neural cor-
relates when enacted). We do not hold infants morally accountable for their 
actions, and we recognize that childhood is at best a setting stage for the de-
velopment of a moral sense. And although we admit that only adults can be 
considered responsible for their actions, we recognize that their comportment 
too reflects norms and values that are both acquired and constitutive of their 
moral agency. In brief, if morality is an emergent property of a certain type 
of socialization and not simply an adaptive trait, at least some of its features 
should be easily accommodated by the dynamic of social and interpersonal 
relations.
Nonetheless, even as a late achievement responsibility- entailing moral 
agency still demands that cognitive mechanisms, specifically those that 
regulate an individual’s capacity for self- monitoring, self- control, and self- 
correction, are in good working order. Indeed conditions we typically associate 
with various psychopathies (and sociopathies) pose a challenge to this devel-
opmental account of moral responsibility. Likewise conditions associated 
with various forms of mental and moral cultivation suggest that introspective 
awareness and volitional control play a key role in modulating neuroplasti-
city (see Lutz, Dunne, & Davidson, 2007; Brefczynski- Lewis, Lutz, Schaefer, 
Levinson, & Davidson, 2008). At least for now the jury is still out on whether 
genetic, environmental, social, and interpersonal factors provide merely scaf-
folding for the development of a moral sense or are constitutive of it.
As I will argue, biological and neurobiological accounts of the origins and 
development of fine- grained aﬀective responses can no longer be ignored in 
discussions about the nature of ethics in general and of Buddhist ethics in 
particular. Of course neuroscience may not be able to tell us, solely on the 
basis of their neural signatures in the brain, why only certain feelings and dis-
positions should provide a basis for moral agency. For instance, a disposition 
to act in a way that shows concern for others, even if habitually acquired, can-
not be deemed compassionate if it is not freely undertaken. But such empiri-
cal inquiries into the nature of morality can tell us whether the kind of moral 
judgment we associate with compassionate concern for others is primarily 
driven by aﬀective or cognitive mechanisms.
Does the bodhisattva, the iconic representation of compassionate under-
taking, act in a deliberate manner, or is his or her ethical conduct merely 
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an embodied mode of coping with the situation at hand? Buddhist accounts 
of moral cultivation agree that for an action to be deemed compassionate it 
must have been freely undertaken (unlike selfish actions, which are rooted in 
insurmountable habitual and compulsive tendencies such as greed and delu-
sion). Actions that do not possess the right sort of responsibility- conferring 
capacity, therefore, fall outside the moral domain. But here we run into a 
dilemma:  insofar as bodhisattvas act compassionately on account of their 
training and cultivation (presumably they cannot do so otherwise), they can 
benefit sentient beings habitually or spontaneously (that is, without forming 
an intention to act in a deliberate manner).5 Thus either the bodhisattva’s com-
passionate deeds count as (freely undertaken) moral acts, or they are purely 
spontaneous, thus mysterious, unpredictable, and outside the framework of 
moral responsibility. But, of course, nothing can be “outside the framework of 
moral responsibility”– – hence the reference in the title to the television series 
Breaking Bad that chronicles a spectacular example of moral downfall:  to 
“break bad” in this context is to move decisively against the conventions of 
one’s social environment to gain access to a larger nexus of action. By analogy, 
to “break good” is thus to enter a comprehensive and seemingly unfathom-
able arena of moral action.6
In what follows I will argue that the “spontaneity of compassion” picture 
we glean from the Mahāyāna ethical literature is problematic in light of the 
demands placed on our conceptions of moral agency by moral responsibility– 
entailing practices.7 The question, then, is whether the achievement of moral 
ends requires a more robust conception of agency than the Buddhist no- self 
view can provide.
6.2.  Virtue, Moral Agency, and 
Consequentialism
One of the most elaborate (and inspiring) accounts of the Buddhist path to 
moral and mental cultivation is found in Śāntideva’s A Guide to the Path to 
Awakening (Bodhicaryāvatāra, hereinafter BCA), an immensely influential text 
that has been interpreted as advancing a version of either consequentialism 
or virtue ethics. While both ethical theories (and their variants) supply useful 
conceptual tools for unpacking this (broadly Mahāyāna) Buddhist ethical pro-
gram, they cannot satisfactorily account for the meta- ethical principles that 
inform it. My intention is not to showcase the unique features of Buddhist 
ethics (such as they are) but to ask what Buddhist forms of moral and mental 
cultivation tell us about the nature of mind and how it can be altered (or, al-
ternatively, about what moral agency is and how it is achieved).8 If Buddhist 
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neuroethics is concerned with the neural basis of enlightened moral agency 
(specifically the agency of those undergoing secular mindfulness and compas-
sion meditation training), then established correlations between subpersonal 
processes (specifically those that regulate aﬀective, retributive, and cognitive 
behavior) and first- person accounts (of what it is like to cultivate and exercise 
compassion, forbearance, or equanimity) ought to extend rather than limit the 
scope of moral agency. Indeed any evidence that self- concern may be regu-
lated by mechanisms that also monitor our interest in the well- being of others 
should provide suﬃcient ground for advancing a more robust account of the 
eﬃcacy of compassion meditation practice.
Nietzsche’s disquieting attitude toward the ethics of compassion notwith-
standing, what explains the appeal of Buddhism in the West is precisely this 
emphasis on what may be deemed its cardinal virtues: nonviolence, compas-
sion, and a general spirit of tolerance. Of course these virtues are embedded 
in the theoretical structure of Buddhist ethics (itself part of the Buddhist path 
writ large)— a project whose characterization lacks scholarly consensus. I will 
not enter this debate here.9 Instead, following recent work in neuroethics and 
cognitive moral psychology10— and its implication for analytic reconstruc-
tions of Buddhist ethics such as one finds, for instance, in Siderits (2008), 
Goodman (2009), and Flanagan (2011)— I will ask to what extent the view 
that moral principles are informed by emotionally driven intuitions rather 
than, say, deliberate moral reasoning can be said also to apply in the Buddhist 
context.
Containing what is perhaps the most developed account of moral and 
mental progress on the bodhisattva path— the iconic representation of a life 
dedicated to pursing enlightened knowledge for the sake of benefiting all 
sentient beings— A Guide to the Path of Awakening also showcases the cen-
trality of compassion for Buddhist ethics. Although the cultivation of distinct 
moral sentiments is suggestive of a virtue- ethical approach, Śāntideva views 
compassion through what seems like a strongly consequentialist framework. 
Bodhisattvas with a well- developed character are called upon to exercise judg-
ment when acting in the name of compassion. Thus “for the one who under-
stands the work of compassion even the forbidden is permitted” (BCA 5.84). It 
is obvious from statements such as these that genuine compassion is accom-
panied by a level of discretion that permits the bodhisattva to act in peculiar 
ways; specifically it allows for breaking moral precepts like lying and killing 
without incurring the retributive eﬀects of these acts (or, at the very least, 
without the threat of punishment).
That a well- developed character should be enough to mitigate the conse-
quences of (seemingly unfathomable) compassionate acts has led some to 
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propose that (Mahāyāna) Buddhist ethics is best understood as a type of char-
acter consequentialism: the value of generous acts depends on the value they 
confer upon all those involved, the agent as well as the beneficiary. If com-
passion is an outcome of character development, and Buddhist flourishing 
is essentially the embodiment of those perfections deemed essential for the 
bodhisattva to carry out his or her work in the world, then compassion is 
not agent- neutral. The generally consequentialist framework of Buddhist eth-
ics, then, cannot be universalist, even though theoretically the bodhisattva is 
called upon to maximize happiness (and eliminate suﬀering) for all sentient 
beings.
As Charles Goodman (2009, p. 43) has quite convincingly argued, agent- 
neutrality makes consequentialism quite demanding; that is, it calls for great 
acts of self- sacrifice, which seems not only unrealistic but perhaps unachiev-
able as well. How else is one to interpret Śāntideva’s famous aspiration of 
bringing an end to suﬀering: “As long as space abides, as long as the world 
abides, / So long shall I abide, destroying the suﬀerings of the world” (BCA 
10.55)? Whether the ethical ideals of the bodhisattva are suggestive of an agent- 
neutral framework, and whether that framework makes Buddhist ethics seem 
closer to consequentialism than to virtue ethics, is precisely what is at stake. 
For someone like Damien Keown (2001), positive accounts of pleasure and the 
pursuit of happiness for all sentient beings, such as are found, for instance, in 
the Sutra of Golden Light (Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra), suggest that the bodhisattva 
idea does fit the virtue- ethical model, where the ultimate good is a caring and 
compassionate love. Developing such obvious virtues as generosity, compas-
sion, and insight is generally how one attains this ultimate good. But these 
virtues may be also regarded as having an instrumental value, insofar as they 
tend to counteract various defilements such as greed, hatred, and delusion 
and to promote progress toward Buddhahood. For Keown these virtues form 
an intrinsic part of the Buddhist conception of the good. A similar conception 
of Buddhist flourishing is articulated by Peter Harvey (2000, p.  354), who 
likewise notes the role certain attitudes and practices can have in fostering the 
cultivation of such virtues as generosity, compassion, and insight. Of course 
insofar as the roots of the good here have instrumental value, this ethical 
model may also be viewed in character- consequentialist terms. Goodman 
(2009, p. 88) summarizes this view quite well when he writes that “happi-
ness and the absence of suﬀering, as well as virtues and the absence of vices, 
are elements on an objective list that defines well- being.”
How is this well- being achieved? And what sort of leverage does a bodhi-
sattva (with well- developed character) have in maximizing happiness and 
minimizing suﬀering for all beings? It is certainly the case that individuals 
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not only have diﬀerent needs but also occupy diﬀerent rungs of the moral 
ladder. It is here that the exercise of judgment takes precedence in mediat-
ing (or perhaps moderating) the disposition to act in a compassionate way. 
The Buddhist literature abounds with examples in which enlightened beings 
use deception to help beginners make progress on the path. (Some of the 
best examples are those from the Lotus Sutra: the Prodigal Son, the Burning 
House, and the Phantom City.)11 What is the purpose of these examples of 
deception in the name of a (presumably) higher good? On the one hand, 
they reflect the specifically Mahāyāna demand that the early teachings of the 
Buddha be seen as provisory by comparison with such later teaching as one 
finds in Mahāyāna literature. On the other, they show the cardinal principle 
of excellence in means (upāyakauśalya) at work. For someone like Śāntideva, 
excellence in means is called for to explain why actions that are proscribed 
under general ethical precepts (like speaking the truth and causing no harm 
to others) could be permitted. Classic examples are found in such texts as the 
Discourse on the Excellence in Means (Upāyakauśalya Sūtra), where bodhisattvas 
are allowed to break standards precepts or rules so long as they are motivated 
by compassion.12 On this account, the early teachings do not tell people what 
is the case, just what is most beneficial to them given their present situation. 
Such a view would be at odds specifically with Kantian views of morality, since 
for Kant deception, whatever its ultimate goal, disrespects human dignity. 
I will return to this issue when considering the Buddhist position on moral 
responsibility.
Given that Śāntideva does have an explicit position on whether and in what 
circumstances the interests of some may be weighted against the welfare of oth-
ers, the expectation is that at least some of the classical features of consequen-
tialism should apply in his case. Goodman identifies, specifically in a passage 
from the Compendium on Trainings (Śīkṣā- samuccaya, hereinafter ŚS), not only 
some but by his count “all” the classical features of act- consequentialism: “the 
central moral importance of happy and unhappy states of mind; the exten-
sion of scope to all beings; the extreme demands; the absence of any room 
for personal moral space; the balancing of costs and benefits; and the pursuit 
of maximization” (Goodman, 2009, p. 97). The passage extolls the eﬀorts of 
the bodhisattva who, “through actions of body, speech, and mind … makes a 
continuous eﬀort to stop all present and future suﬀering and depression, and 
to produce present and future happiness and gladness, for all beings” (ŚS, in 
Goodman, 2009, p. 97).
Given the bodhisattva’s extreme dedication to pursuing the welfare of all 
sentient beings, the framework of act- consequentialism must provide a way to 
account for the psychological and neuropsychological mechanisms that could 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Thu Mar 23 2017, NEWGEN
oso-9780190499761.indd   115 3/23/2017   1:37:43 PM
116 C O N S T R U C T I N G  B U D D H I S T   E T H I C S
16
underpin such ethical conduit. Indeed it is not enough to say that Buddhist 
ethics is best captured by a specific theory— in this case, consequentialism. 
One must also ask whether this theory reflects a characteristically Buddhist 
understanding of the good (e.g., minimizing suﬀering and maximizing hap-
piness) or simply represents a manifestation of the sort of psychological pat-
terns that are integral to moral sentiments.
6.3.  Evidence from Neuroimaging
The Buddhist ethical literature contains frequent references to characteris-
tics like generosity, compassion, and insight that are considered beneficial 
or wholesome (kuśala) and thus conducive to achieving the ultimate ends 
that Buddhists seek. They are typically contrasted with traits like greed, ha-
tred, and delusion, which constitute a major cause of suﬀering and thus an 
obstacle to achieving these ends. Both sets of characteristics are classified 
under the Abhidharma category of mental states (caitta). For moral psycholo-
gists who wish to get to the roots of morality, the question is this: Which of 
these mental states are to be understood primarily in aﬀective and which 
primarily in cognitive terms (even as the classification of mental states in 
the Abhidharma literature admits of no such distinction)?13 It is important 
to maintain this distinction, given its relevance to neuroimaging studies,14 
which take certain areas of the brain, primarily the dorsolateral surfaces of 
the prefrontal cortex and parietal lobes, to be associated with cognitive pro-
cesses, while others, specifically the amygdala and the medial surfaces of 
the frontal and parietal lobes, track emotional states such as moods and gut 
feelings.15
To see whether moral judgments have an emotional component and in 
what circumstances (and whether) the emotional response may be overrid-
den, let’s briefly consider some empirical findings about entertaining the 
well- known hypothetical moral dilemmas of the trolley and the footbridge.
In the first instance, a runaway trolley is heading for five people gathered 
some way down a track, who will be killed if the trolley is not diverted onto a 
sidetrack. The only way to save these people is to divert the trolley. The prob-
lem is that there is one person on the alternate sidetrack, who, as a result, will 
end up being killed. What is one to do? Push the switch so that five people are 
saved at the expense of one? In the second instance, the same runaway trol-
ley threatens to kill five people, but instead of proximity to a switch, you find 
yourself on a footbridge next to a large stranger standing right above the track 
with the runaway trolley. The only way to save the five people is to push this 
stranger oﬀ the bridge and onto the incoming trolley. The stranger will die as 
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a result, but his body will stop the trolley in its tracks and save the five people. 
Again, what is one to do?
Neuroimaging studies of subjects presented with these dilemmas show 
a clear pattern of brain activity. Entertaining the more impersonal moral 
dilemma of the trolley corresponds to increased activity in brain regions 
associated with higher cognitive processes like complex planning (see, espe-
cially, Koechlin, Basso, Petrini, Panzer, & Grafman, 1999; Koechlin, Ody, & 
Kouneiher, 2003; Miller & Cohen, 2001) and deductive and inductive reason-
ing (Goel & Dolan, 2004). On the other hand, the footbridge dilemma acti-
vates brain regions associated with strong emotional response (Haidt, 2001; 
Greene and Haidt, 2002, and Greene et  al., 2009). Furthermore engaging 
in characteristically consequentialist judgments leads to increased activity in 
those parts of the brain typically associated with higher cognitive functions 
such as decision making and executive control. The traditional approach to 
solving such dilemmas typically invokes the normative framework of eth-
ics. The argument is that our response to these dilemmas should be judged 
relative to norms. Deontologists, for instance, might judge it wrong to harm 
someone in order to save someone else in all circumstances. The question, 
then, is not which ethical theory best fits the empirical data but rather what 
the empirical data tell us about the nature of morality.
As Joshua Greene (2008, p. 43) notes in reviewing the relevant neuroim-
aging studies, “People tend toward consequentialism in the case in which 
the emotional response is low and tend toward deontology in the case in 
which the emotional response is high.” To support his hypothesis, Greene 
cites evidence from evolutionary history; “up close and personal” violence, for 
instance, reaches quite far back into our primate lineage by comparison with 
the types of impersonal harm (e.g., drone strikes) that demand complex forms 
of abstract reasoning. This hypothesis is further supported by reaction times, 
as it takes longer to ponder an impersonal moral dilemma (the trolley case) 
than dilemmas that elicit strong emotional response (the footbridge case). On 
this account, judging a personal moral violation appropriate (that is, judging 
that it is permissible to push the stranger to his death in the footbridge case) 
depends on the capacity to override the emotional response that such an up 
close and personal action would elicit.
What the evidence from neuroimaging so far suggests is that we are hard-
wired to have powerful innate responses to personal violence. We may regard 
these data as providing evidential support for the view that altruistic behavior 
is a natural kind. At the same time the capacity to override strong emotional 
responses implicit in judgments that deem personal moral violations appro-
priate casts a long shadow on any idea of an innate or intrinsic good.
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On the grounds that the cultivation of compassion is essentially a norma-
tive aspect of Buddhist practice, we can now ask: Can a bodhisattva on the path 
of moral and mental cultivation undergo the kind of transformation that ren-
ders consequentialist thought immune to emotional response? The Buddhist 
literature is unambiguous on this point:  compassion meditation has quite 
diﬀerent eﬀects on beginner bodhisattvas than on those who have advanced 
along the path. Beginning bodhisattvas are often portrayed as “overwhelmed 
by compassion” such that they may even be found crying. Progress along the 
path is such that the occasional outburst has given way to equanimity.16
Do emotional responses, then, play any role in the generally consequen-
tialist framework of Mahāyāna Buddhist ethics? In the case of prescriptions 
that sanction moral violations for a greater good, the presumption is that 
bodhisattvas would have developed the capacity to override their emotional 
responses, especially those typically associated with inflicting harm on a 
person judged to be committing some wrongdoing. (The bodhisattva cannot 
be plagued by an internal struggle to overcome such negative emotions as 
remorse.) However, such judgments of wrongdoing presuppose a normative 
framework and imply some notion of moral responsibility. And moral respon-
sibility cannot be understood without addressing the issues of agency and 
free will.
6.4.  Freedom and Human Responsibility
Whether something analogous to the Western notion of free will is found in 
Buddhism is an open question.17 A notion of “the will”— in the sense of vol-
untary action (voluntas)— is indeed presupposed by the Buddhist concept of 
cetanā, variously translated as “volition,” “intention,” and “will.” But at the 
most basic level, cetanā captures the dynamic aspects of the mind relative 
to objects or specific ends. The problem, then, is this: How can accounts of 
action and its consequences (karma) become part of an ethical framework 
given the standpoint of Buddhist reductionism?
Are free will and determinism compatible? Is there a way of reconciling 
our first- person account of volitional action with third- person perspectives of 
the underlying physical, biological, and now neurobiological processes? Is 
there another way of conceiving of humans or, indeed, of being human that 
demands a radical reassessment of our understanding of voluntary action and 
of the causal and motivational factors that inform, condition, and sanction 
our valuing judgments? More specifically for our purpose here, how has the 
relation between volitional and causal accounts of agency been understood in 
the Buddhist context?
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The Buddhist account of this relation originates with Siddhārtha Gautama’s 
experience of enlightenment. This experience becomes at once the source of 
the Buddhist metaphysical picture of reality and the culmination of all human 
aspiration for genuine freedom. Key to this metaphysical picture is the 
causal principle of dependent arising and a thoroughly reductionist account 
of persons, which takes volition to be but one of the many contributing 
factors that shape human identity and agency. In one of his earlier 
discourses, the Buddha declares that we ought to regard any form of 
sensation, attention, and consciousness, whether “past, future, or present; 
internal or external; manifest or subtle … as it actually is… : ‘This is not 
mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am’ ” (SN.iii.49). Of course the 
rejection of a permanent self as the agent of sensory, aﬀective, and mental 
activity poses a significant chal-lenge for Buddhism. If there is no agent, 
and if actions are merely transient events arising within a continuum of 
causally interconnected states, how is the intentional orientation of human 
actions to be understood? Even assuming, as the evidence from cognitive 
neuroscience seems to suggest, that we are psychologically hardwired to 
attribute agency and hold others responsible for their actions, the question 
why such agency- attributing capacities should be accompanied by a moral 
sense remains to be explained. I will return to this point in my conclusion.
Whether we take the Buddhist no- self view to be a theoretical construct or a 
descriptive account of the immediacy of lived experience, its picture of human 
nature and agency undermines (or is irrelevant to) the practical concerns of 
moral responsibility. Now, as some have suggested (most notably Siderits, 
2008), there might be a conflict between the conventional practice of morality 
(to which the Buddha oﬀers precepts, inspiring tales, and rules of conduct) 
and Buddhist metaphysical doctrine. The Kantian distinction invoked here, 
between the concerns of practical reason and theorizing about the nature of 
things, serves as a useful heuristic:  the basic thrust of this broadly Kantian 
view is that when I engage in theoretical reasoning (of the sort that looks for 
causal explanation of events) there is no place for concepts like freedom and 
responsibility. But when I engage in practical reasoning (of the sort that asks 
“What should I do?” and then looks for the most justifiable course of action) 
there are good reasons to hold myself responsible for my actions. That is, 
regardless of whether or not theoretical reason is able to demonstrate free-
dom, practical reason must assume that freedom is possible for the purpose 
of action. Bringing this Kantian perspective to bear on the Buddhist account 
of human agency is motivated by the assumption that the kind of freedom we 
are supposed to consider (and perhaps criticize) is basically as described by 
libertarians, that is, as involving complete spontaneity. Furthermore, as the 
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neuroimaging studies discussed above seem to suggest, the normative frame-
work of deontology may have its roots in a basic tendency to avoid (and thus 
create circumstances that would minimize) the sort of comportment that is 
conducive to heightened emotional response.
Do freedom and responsibility, as artifacts of practical reason, belong in a 
discourse about causation in the natural world?18 If the concerns of practical 
and theoretical reason are taken to be mutually entailing, then they do. On 
the other hand, if theoretical reason is seen to be at odds with our practical 
concerns about how best to live, then they do not. The Buddhist metaphysical 
picture of reality, as a product of theoretical reason, is devoid of any refer-
ence to selves and their concerns, or indeed to anything substantive. At least 
in principle, the no- self view would preclude any robust account of freedom 
and responsibility. Yet Buddhist practice requires the observance of certain 
norms and the valuation of certain types of thought, speech, and action that 
are considered beneficial. Chief among these is the restraint of unmitigated 
willful thought, speech, and action. However, this valuation, and the psycho-
logical terms in which it is expressed, is at odds with an impersonal account 
of the self and subjectivity in causal terms. Siderits’s proposal is that some 
kind of Buddhist compatibilism is called for to solve this conflict. Can such an 
account, in eﬀect, be oﬀered?
Consider Śāntideva’s extension of the permission to break moral rules to 
those who carry out “compassionate” actions. If such an injunction cannot be 
easily justified on a normative account of practical reason, then the largely con-
sequentialist framework of compatibilism cannot give an adequate account of 
our moral institutions. (Such a framework is also indiﬀerent to the concerns 
of practical reason.) Thus Mahāyāna ethicists are not concerned with the pos-
sibility of freedom in a causally ordered universe (such possibility is taken to 
be the modus operandi of all enlightened beings) but with minimizing suf-
fering and/ or maximizing happiness. This account of agency in the service of 
altruistic aims is partly the reason most interpreters have regarded Buddhist 
ethics as essentially utilitarian or consequentialist in scope.19 The problem 
with this account is that it takes moral agency away from ordinary people, who 
come to be regarded as lacking an understanding of how things are and of the 
proper motivation for ethical action. (In some sense they are no better than 
children or the insane.)
Whether conventional morality and the antinomian character of the bod-
hisattva’s conduct are perfectly comprehensible if, as Siderits argues, we take the 
Buddhist account of practical rationality in straightforwardly consequentialist 
terms is, indeed, open to debate. Siderits’s (2008, p. 39) proposal is that we are 
dealing here with two versions of consequentialism: indirect consequentialism 
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for the common folk and act- consequentialism for the  bodhisattva, whose 
enlightened perspective allows for all sorts of shortcuts that are simply not avail-
able to the rest of us. But the trust this view places in our capacity to account 
for motivations that are inscrutable and for responsibilities that are intractable 
makes the Buddhist view of practical rationality seem rather whimsical.
What, then, do the Buddhists debate when they talk about the Eightfold 
Noble Path or the cultivation of perfections as an ethical program? And is this 
seemingly virtue- ethical program compatible with the Buddhist metaphysical 
picture of reality? It is tempting to say that what is at stake here is the so- called 
mechanics of salvation, that is, whether or not the disciplined cultivation at 
the heart of the Eightfold Noble Path guarantees the liberation from suﬀer-
ing and cyclical existence that Buddhists aspire to. The question is this: Can 
disciplined cultivation take the place of practical reason?
Certainly the fact that ethical concerns occupy only the lower rung of the 
Eightfold Path program would suggest that for the Buddhist moral norms 
are conventional and ultimately they should be overcome or even discarded. 
What does that mean for our understanding of the relation between freedom 
and responsibility? It is hard to say.20 The idea that there are types of freedom, 
specifically freedom from suﬀering and rebirth, that are not responsibility- 
entailing (at least not in terms of reasons for which actions might be held 
accountable) seems to advocate a type of libertarian agency that is hard to 
reconcile with Buddhist reductionism.
6.5.  Conclusion
When Śāntideva allows for moral rules to be violated under the expediency of a 
compassionate aim, he likewise undermines the traditional notion of respon-
sibility.21 Of course the absence of a strictly causal account of action poses an 
even greater threat than does any notion of determinism. If prior conditioning 
does not determine our thoughts and actions, then they must be either ran-
dom or spontaneous. And indeterminism does not make things any easier for 
the compatibilist than determinism does; quite the contrary (bumper- sticker 
wisdom of the sort that urges us to “practice random acts of kindness” not-
withstanding). Neocompatibilist positions such as one finds, for instance, in 
Flanagan (2002), address some of these challenges by showing how, if we 
dispense with the incoherent notion of libertarian agency, some notion of 
responsibility can be salvaged. For Flanagan and all neocompatibilists who 
recognize the need to take cognitive science seriously, the main issue is that 
our traditional notions of agency and responsibility are in need of revision. 
Indeed recent advances in the study of human cognition suggest that much 
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of our conscious mental life depends on subconscious cognitive processes. 
In setting out to oﬀer an account of how the two pictures are compatible, 
neocompatibilists shift the dependency relation for freedom and responsibil-
ity from norms to facts. Critics of this sort of approach, and here I  would 
include myself, point out that the results of cognitive science are subject to 
constant revision and that a notion of moral agency explainable in terms of, 
say, dispositions is provisory at best.22 Indeed the normative features of moral 
reasoning do not sit well with the revisionist methods of science, at least not 
as traditionally understood, even though there are no good reasons to exclude 
moral norms from the purview of empirical research.
Now just as conscious awareness remains the single most puzzling and 
most diﬃcult phenomenon to explain in reductive terms, the patterns exhib-
ited by moral agency also resist the eliminative reductionism of certain types 
of scientific explanation. Some philosophers of cognitive science argue that 
human consciousness is inherently intersubjective, and therefore empathy 
must count as a precondition of consciousness (Thompson, 2001). This line 
of argumentation suggests that agency presupposes some degree of self- 
awareness and of concern for others, both of which resist impersonal causal 
explanation. Maybe the Buddhist ethicists have in mind a similar sort of resis-
tance when they allow for the compassionate aspirations of the bodhisattva 
to trump psychological determinism. However, if the bodhisattva can attain a 
type of freedom that is unimpeded by karmic hindrances, the eﬃcacy of his 
or her actions (outside the web of interdependent causation) becomes deeply 
mysterious. After all, as we noted above, tales of bodhisattvas who intervene, 
as if magically, to take humans out of the trap of cyclical existence abound in 
the Buddhist literature. Does that make the bodhisattva a sort of compassion-
ate libertine? Perhaps. But in that case genuine compassion implies a kind of 
spontaneity that is not easily captured by notions of moral agency that depend 
only on the actual or foreseeable consequences of acts. Whether such compas-
sionate spontaneity also possesses the right sort of responsibility- conferring 
capacity cannot be settled without further probing the mesh that is the 
bodhisattva’s practical wisdom and skillful concern for others.
Abbreviations
BCA  Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra. Translations from K. Crosby & A. Skilton 
in Śāntideva (1995).
SN  Saṃyutta Nikāya, volume and page in the Pali Text Society edition. 
Translations from Bodhi (2000).
SŚ Śāntideva’s Śīkṣā- samuccaya. In Śāntideva (2016).
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Notes
1. The exception here is Nussbaum’s (2001) comprehensive account of the cogni-
tive structure of compassion in the context of an analysis of what she regards, 
borrowing a concept from Greek theater, as the tragic predicament of the human 
condition. Taking as her point of departure Aristotle’s view of compassion—
which, following Homer and Plato, he regards as a painful emotion directed at 
another person’s misfortune— Nussbaum aligns herself with those who defend 
the centrality of compassion to any moral theory (e.g., Rousseau, Schopenhauer, 
and Adam Smith) against the opponents of emotion (e.g., the Greek and Roman 
Stoics, Spinoza, Kant, and Nietzsche). Noting the centrality of altruistic concerns 
to certain philosophical conceptions of morality (especially those that appeal to 
evolutionary theory to make the case that psychological altruism is true), Stich, 
Doris, and Roedder (2010) rightly identify compassion as the sort of "right emo-
tion” for producing moral motivation. Nonetheless, they pay only scant atten-
tion to the role of compassion in explaining the link between moral motivation 
and voluntary action.
2. An extensive review of the literature on aﬀective neuroscience and compassion 
is found in Davidson (2002). See also Lamm, Batson, and Decety (  2007), Lutz, 
Brefczynski- Lewis, Johnstone, and Davidson ( 2008), and Mascaro, Rilling, 
Tenzin Negi, and Raison (2012) for studies that showcase high empathic 
responses in individuals who undergo a form of secularized analytical 
compassion meditation.
3. See Coseru (2012, Chapter 3.3). Note that “intentional content” here is broadly 
conceived to include both what the mental state is a state of (its object) as well 
as its own operations. Of course whether intentional content is distinct from the 
objects intended by such mental acts as perceiving or judging is a controversial 
topic. For more on this debate, see Zahavi (2004).
4. Wilson’s (1998, p. 54) suggestion that “causal explanation of brain activity and 
evolution” suﬃces as an explanation of moral behavior may be unwarranted in 
light of the fact that moral judgment has the capacity to alter conditioned behav-
ior in substantive ways; being made aware, for instance, that one is 
evolutionarily conditioned to favor members of one’s group over outsiders can, 
on reflection, lead to adopting a more egalitarian view. Although tracing the 
history of moral behavior is notoriously diﬃcult, its roots are generally assumed 
to lie in an innate  biological altruism (which is found in many species). It is this 
biological altruism that underpins the more complex psychological altruism at 
the heart of our so- called ethical project (cf. Kitcher, 2011). Indeed only the latter 
can explain how we  come to care for the welfare of others not for our but for 
their own sake.
5. For an argument in favor of the spontaneity of compassion, see Williams (2009, 
pp. 116– 117). In his discussion of BCA 9.34– 35, Williams takes the view that bud-
dhas are disposed to help precisely because they lack reifying and modal proposi-
tional attitudes. 
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 6. I owe this suggestion to Sheridan Hough, who explores the causal aspects of 
agency and intersubjectivity in her essay on Breaking Bad; as she points out 
(Hough, 2016, p. 218), the series creator, Vince Gilligan, “denies the discrete or 
independent reality of the objects and persons within the causal structure.” As 
Gilligan himself puts it: “I like to believe … that karma kicks in at some point, 
even if it takes years or decades to happen” (quoted in Hough, 2016, p. 218).
 7. I explore this issue at length in Coseru (2016), where I also address the ten-
sion between the Buddhist account of the irreducibility of the mental and the 
tendency to confine freedom and responsibility to the domain of social conven-
tion. If the Buddhist’s ultimate ontology contains phenomenal primitives, then 
freedom and responsibility cannot be mere artifacts of conceptual proliferation.
 8. While the secondary literature of Buddhist ethics has grown considerably 
in recent years, with few exceptions (notably Keown, 1996; Siderits, 2008; 
Goodman, 2009; Garfield, 2010; Finnigan, 2011), most treatments are still exe-
getical in scope and anchored in specific texts and/ or traditions. Surveys that 
address the relevance of Buddhist ethical principles to a wider range of topics, 
including such controversial issues as human rights, animal rights, ecology, 
war, and abortion, are found in Cooper and James (2005) and Keown (2007).
 9. Readers may consult the excellent surveys in Harvey (2000), Keown (2001), 
Clayton (2006), and Goodman (2009). I  address some of the same issues in 
Coseru (2016).
 10. See especially Farah (2005), Gazzaniga (2005), Greene and Haidt (2002), and 
Greene (2008, 2009).
 11. For a close look at the expedient role of these parables, with specific reference to 
the Prodigal Son, in the Lotus Sutra, see Lai (1981).
 12. An ethics of compassionate violence, as Stephen Jenkins (2010, p.  326) has 
convincingly argued, works by “removing the possibility that any action is 
essentially inauspicious.” Such an ethics, then, coupled with the (metaphysical) 
notion that the workings of karma are generally inconceivable, not only engen-
ders ambiguity about the bodhisattva’s ethical program but also diminishes the 
capacity for moral certainty.
 13. See Dreyfus (2002) for an illuminating account of the diﬃculties of cross- 
cultural approaches to mental typologies with specific reference to the dialogue 
between Buddhism and cognitive science.
 14. See, especially, Koechlin, Ody, and Kouneiher (2003), Miller and Cohen (2001), 
and Ramnani and Owen (2004).
 15. See, especially, Adolphs (2002), Maddock (1999), and Phan, Wager, Taylor, and 
Liberzon, (2002).
 16. Contrast, for example, BCA 2.50, “In despair, I  cry out for help to protector 
Avalokiteśvara, who acts compassionately and inerrantly, begging him to pro-
tect my vicious self”, with BCA 10.2, “Whoever is suﬀering distress of body or 
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mind in any of the ten directions— may they obtain oceans of happiness and joy 
through my good actions.”
 17. See Dasti and Bryant (2014) and Repetti (2016), and contributions therein.
 18. Addressing a similar issue, but with respect to the moral implications of 
advances in neuroscience, Hilary Bok (2007) concludes that learning about the 
many ways freedom can be undermined (by phobias, compulsions, failures of 
self- control, etc.) oﬀers an opportunity to conceive of freedom in more eﬀec-
tive terms. Bok proposes that we understand freedom as a “capacity for self- 
governance” rather than as a type of choice- driven action (p. 559).
 19. Proposals that advance a utilitarian interpretation of Buddhist ethics are found 
in, among others, Pratt (1928), Kalupahana (1976), and Goodman (2009).
 20. I do, however, venture a response to this question in Coseru (2016).
 21. See BCA 5.83 and ŚS 168.11, and discussion in Clayton (2009, p. 23).
 22. Stich, Doris, and Roedder (2010) reach the same conclusion about employing 
evolutionary theory to intervene in the empirical debate between altruists and 
egoists: useful as it may be, in the end, neither camp makes a convincing case.
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